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- Transparency Process -
l Special Monitoring Visit (SMV) teams use portable non-destructive assay (NDA) equipment to assure that 
the Russian HEU being processed is weapons material.
l The SMV and the Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) monitors observe the processing of Russian HEU 
to assure material conversion to a fluoride for blending.
l The SMV/TMO monitors and the Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) assure that the processed HEU is 
blended to the LEU which is then shipped to the United States.
l Data retrieval and analysis further assure that observed and declared plant operations are consistent with 
the annual rate of LEU deliveries to the United States. 
l An assessment of these elements provides a level of assurance that nonproliferation objectives are met.
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- Mission -
Provide assurance that the low enriched uranium(LEU) being purchased under the 
1993 U.S. / Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement is derived 
from HEU extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons.
l Build confidence that the Russian HEU is extracted from 
dismantled nuclear weapons; 
l Build confidence that this same HEU is oxidized;
l Build confidence that the declared quantity of HEU is 
blended down to LEU; and
l Demonstrate that the LEU delivered to the U. S. is 
fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors.
- Transparency Objectives -
- Scope -
In Russia
Four Russian Federation facilities are subject to 
monitoring by the United States:
l Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk
l Mayak Production Association (MPA) in Ozersk
l Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk
l Ural Electrochemical Integrated Enterprise (UEIE) in 
Novouralsk
In the United States
Five facilities are subject to monitoring by the Russian 
Federation:
l Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky
l Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas in North Carolina
l Framatome-Lynchburg in Virginia
l Framatome-Richland in Washington
l Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility in South 
Carolina
The Program has monitored a total of 261.7 metric tons (MT) of HEU being 
converted to LEU and delivered to the United States from 1995 through 
December 2005.
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- FY 2005 Results -
l The BDMS continued to monitor UEIE and ECP blending operations. A third BDMS began operation 
at SChE. Equipment was operable 100% of time. 
l U.S. experts conducted 22 of the 24 allowed monitoring visits to Russian facilities.
l TMO coverage of 80% at UEIE exceeded the 76% performance goal.
l The Program monitored the conversion of 30 MT of HEU into LEU and acquired accountability and 
transparency data and documents.
- FY 2006 Goals -
l The BDMS will monitor blending operations at all three blending sites, UEIE, ECP, and SChE. 
Equipment operability target is 95%. 
l U.S. experts will conduct 28 monitoring visits to Russian facilities.
l TMO coverage at UEIE is scheduled at 77% of plant operational time.
l The Program will monitor the conversion of 30 MT of HEU into LEU and acquire, archive, and 
analyze accountability and transparency data and documents.
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